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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
General Introduction 
The Constitution and its First Amendment set forth guarantees for 
-------- ······· .... -, .. ···-··-·~ --·.-· .,-.... , ...... -... - ·--··· - .. ·· .. 
the p_rot~s_!=JP!l- 0 ,9:f" ;i.i;:i.,c)Jvid'l,lal rights that provide a qasi!:l for civil liber-
~--~--,.,--,.- -- .. -...-e- - '"-·-· .- -··-· . - ·-
ties in the United States. In recent years, a central issue .in the 
development of civil liberties has been the conscientious objector's 
struggle to establish safeguards for the exercise ~f personal freedom 
to conform to the dictates of conscience, that is, the rights of a 
conscientious objector to refuse to serve in the armed forces or to 
bear arms because it would be contrary to his moral or religious 
principles. 
Congress has given some recognition to conscientious objectors'· 
status by exempting them from military conscription under certain cir-
cumstances, The law protects freedom of conscience by applying the 
legal process to the classification of conscientious objectors and by 
allowing the conscientious objector to serve in ways other than combat 
or military service. Although the principle of freedom of conscience 
has been written into law, it has not always been consistently applied. 
That is, not all of those objectors who are genuinely conscientious 
1 
. 1 
have been protected or treated equally. 
The Problem ' 
2 
The validity of the conscientious objector's exemption is dependent 
upon a valid and reasonable classification. The purpose of this thesis 
-----~---""·-·----·-------- - .. · . .:,, 
is to investigate whether the conscientious objector provisions of the 
draft act which distinguish -~-=~~!~~-_,reli,S,ioll_§,)~Ji_e~s,a.nj_E,<:.~~-~al, 
...____ ____________ ,, ... -=---,-,. . . -- . ··-·-=,., 
sociological, or __ pe~f>9Jl:?Jc,JllO.r.a-1 .. bel-ie.fs--,-··C·Onsti.tute. J:L,,GQ:Q._§t,j,t;µtionally 
,., .. ,...--·· .. -,·.-~---.·· __ . __ .._·--• .. , .... ,.,.;,, ..... __ ,.,. __ ... - . . .,.·:,,, ---:·:-.-
vali~ b_a.~.i~,.J.9-r. ... dis.c:cim.ina.t.ing .. .inoJ~hec,,g:r:?P-t:l:JJJ1;,_.9Le.~~m:pt~~~---~.:~~ -~ili-
tary service, 
. -·.· •·'. ~,,·;_ . ·- .. _,,,.,., 
As a result of the opposition to the war in Vietnam, an increasing 
number of selective conscientious objectors -- those who conscientiously 
oppose fighting in a specific war (i,e, Vietnam) but not all wars --
are attempting to achieve the legal status of conscientious objector. 
Currently, the law exempts anyone, "who, by reason of religious train-
ing and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in 
..::::_.._ """r~ .. ,.,_. '. ".";_' ~-:. ·• ''":"·., ... ,. •.~, '"" 
.. ·-.. '\ .. ,' 
2 
any form." _ . Y.119:~)'.'._ tl:ie law, 11 the .term . '-religious._. training,, .a,n._4, belief' 
!,,. ~-- ..••.. - ·- "'. . ·: ~ . . . 
does I_l,~1: !Pclude .. essentially polit'ic'ai, ·socio---logical,.o-,; pq.gosophical 
v:iews ;-· or· a merely personal moral' C:O'de/'3 
The statutory qualifications which limits conscientious objector 
status to those individuals "who, by reason of religious training and 
belief" not including "essentially political, sociological, or 
1 Carl Cohen, "The Case for Selective Pacifism," The Nation, 
July 8, 1968, p. 14. 
-- ----~ 
2Public Law. 90-40, 90th Congress, S. 1432, June 30, 196 7, Con-
scientious Objectors. 62 Stat. 612 (1967). 
3Ibid 
philosophical views or merely personal moral code" are opposed to com-
pulsory military service, may constitute religious discrimination. 4 
Statutory limitation of the qualification for legal protection because 
of the particular content of the individual's moral principles may be 
said to discriminate among different beliefs. 
Thus, although certain conscientious objectors are protected by 
law, exemption from military service should be extended to all those 
who are conscientiously opposed to participation in war and not merely 
reserved for some because of their special beliefs. The law should 
provide equal protection of all objectors who are conscientiously 
opposed to participation in war. The law should also recognize those 
conscientious objectors who are opposed to a particular war or kind of 
war if it is to'be logically consistent with the United States Consti-
tution. 
Review of Literature 
A review of the literature concerning conscientious objectors 
3 
indicates that the term and meaning of selective conscientious ,objector 
is a relatively new area under investigation. - 5 Harold Sherk contenls 
that the public is.confused with regard to the state of the law dealing 
with conscientious objectors. "Much of the confusion is due to mis-
information or ignorance as to the state of the law and current 
5nirector, National Service Board for Religious Objectors, 550 
Washington Bldg., Washington, D. C. 
4 
. 6 procedures." Therefore, much of the literature dealing with conscien-
tious objectors constitutes an investigation of the meaning and applica-. 
tion of the Military Selective Service Act which states that: 
( Nothing contained in this title shall be construed to 
! require any person to be subject to combatant training I and service in the armed forces of the United States 
Ji who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any 
I form. As used in this subsection, the term 'religious 
I training and belief' does not inclucj.e essentially 
/ political, sociological, or7philosophical views, or a 
I merely personal moral code. 
t 
\ •. ~.r.--, ··.: . 
- -·· -According to Peter Elbow, 8 the Military Selective Service Act, 
which classifies conscientious objectors, rests on three criteria: 
"religious training and belief", ''conscientiously", and "opposed to. 
participation in war in any form. 119 
Religious training and belief "does not include essentially 
political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a merely personal 
moral code" according to the law.[therefore, to obtain the status of 
a conscientious objector, a registrant must hold a religious position 
instead of a political, sociologi~al, philosophical or personal moral 
code position~ The Supreme Court in United States v Seeger, 10 however, 
6 J. Harold Sherk, "The Position of the Conscielltious Objector," 
Current History, July, 1968, p. 21. 
7Public Law 90-40, 90th Congress, S. 1432, June 30, 1967. 62 Stat. 
612 (1967). 
8Mr. Elbow, a graduate student at Brandeis University, serves 
draft counselor for the American Service Committee in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts. 
as a 
9Peter Elbow, "Who Is a Conscientious Objector?," The Christian 
Century, !.Y£. (1968)~ pp. 989-991. 
l0380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
5 
stated the test in these words: "A sincere and meaningful belief which 
occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled 
by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption comes within 
statutory definition. 1111 In view of the Supreme Court's decision in 
Seeger, the District Court Judge, Alexander Harvey II, ruled that 
Michael H. Shacter, an atheist, was qualified for conscientious objec-
, 12 ·---) 
tor s status·___; 
While the statutory exemption requires "religious training and 
belief" as a basis for exempting conscientious objectors, John de J. 
13 Pemberton states that "political judgments that enter into the 
conscientious conclusion do not necessarily make that conclusion less 
1 . . 1114 re 1g1ous. That is, a religious pacifist may believe a particular 
war is unjust and politically dangerous, as well as believe that his 
participation in war would be contrary to his moral or religious 
principles. 
Elbow's second criteria, ''conscientiously", implies sincerity. 
Elbow conteni s that "there is a t~ndency on the part of draft boarc;ls 
and even courts to judge a man's sincerity on the basis of his reply to 
the question on the use of force. ~hat is, unless a person is opposed 
to every form of force, he cannot be sincere in his objection to the 
11Ibid., p, 176. 
12T. ime, December 20, 1968, p. 42. 
13Executive Director, American Civil Liberties Union, New York, 
City. 
14John de J. Pemberton, Jr., "The War Protester," Current History, 
July, 1968, p. 27. 
Vietnam war, "{;:J The courts , recognize 
religiously as to theistic as well as 
tQat sincerity may be expressed 
non-theistic beliefs.[:'The Court 
in the Seeger~ corttends that any serious belief central to a 
person's life view should qualif:y him for a conscientious objector's 
classification as long as his belief is "religio.~Jurthermore, 
"local boards and courts . , . are not free to reject beliefs because 
6 
they consider them 'incomprehensible'. Their task is to decide whether 
the beliefs professed by the registrant are sincerely held and whether 
they are, in his own scheme of things, religious. 1116 
Finally, Congress contencfts that "opposed to participation in war 
in any form" is essentially a political objection, This implies the 
proposition that it is impossible for an individual to object to a 
particular war on religious grounds. For example, a religious person 
;who objects to the war in Vietnam and not to all wars would not be 
classified as a religious objector. Furthermore, because opposition 
to participation in all wars is considered to be absolute, Elbow 
contends that "the question of how it applies to finite unpredictable 
reality is subject to dispute. 1117 
The Hypothesis 
It is the hypothesis of this study that there is a judicial trend 
towards enlargement of the area of legally acceptable conscientious 
objector status which presently includes "all sincere religious beliefs 
15 Elbow, 
16u . d nite 
17Ibid, 
p. 991. 
States v Seeger, p. 185, 
which are based upon a power or being, or upon a faith, to which all 
18 
else is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately dependent." 
The Supreme Court in the Seeger Case. st.!ited. the te:s,t in these words: 
"A sincer~ .. ~-d meaningful l)elief y;rlJ.ich occupies in the life of its 
--.------~--··· ·-. 
possessor a place parallel ;o that filled by.th~ Ge>d of those admit-
7 
t dl l "f i f th t" . h" d f" "t' 1119 e y qu~ _ _:1:,}.:U~.- or e ~xemp -~on comes.,. ~~;}::!l.,s-~1:1tut<:>:Y.,. :,}:~1. 1.on. 
r---., 
The Court's opinion indicates a trend towards accepting a wide range of 
"religious" beliefs extending from acceptance of the supernatural to 
. 2~', 
doctrines of ethical humanism and beyond,· in order to provide equal 
protection of all objectors who are conscientiously opposed to partici-
pating in w~J-.~: is submitted that the present draft law appears to 
be in conflict with the First Amendment because it fails to grant 
exemptions to those who are conscientious objectors on non-religious 
grounds. ~That is, the present law puts the government in support of 
specific religious beliefs and discriminates against atheists or those 
men who "whether they be religious or not are motivated in their 
objections to the draft by profound moral beliefs which constitute the 
central convictions of their beliefs. 1121)herefore, the section 
exempting conscientious objectors in the 1967 draft act denies equal 
protection by preferring religious objectors over non-religious 
18Ibid. 
19Ibid. 
ZOibid. 
21rn Boston, U, S. District Judge Charles E, Wyzanski, Jr. 
ruled that the Selective Service Act of 1967 was inconstitutional 
in violation of the First Amendment because it failed to grant draft 
exemptions to those who are conscientious objectors on non-religious 
grounds. Houston Chronicle, April 1, 1969, p, 1, 
objectors, It also appears to violate the due process clause of the 
Fifth .Amendment because it discriminates between different forms of 
religious beliefs. 
The Fifth Amendment does not contain an equal 
protection clause as does the Fourteenth Amendment 
•••• But the concepts of equal protection and due 
process , •• But the concepts of equal protection 
and due process ••• are not mutually exclusive. The 
'equal protection of the laws' is a more explicit 
safeguard of prohibited unfairness than 'due process 
of law,' and, therefore, we do not imply that the two 
are always interchangeable phrases. But, as this 
Court has recognized, discrimination may be so21zn-justifiable as to be violative of due process. 
Finally, in denying exemption to those pacifists who do not sub-
scribe to the government's religious doctrine and qualifications, the 
draft law may also violate the provisions of the First Amendment that 
"Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof , 1123 For example, 
granting exemption to objectors on religious grounds but denying it to 
conscientious objectors whose grounds are humanitarian, moral, philo-
sophical, or ethical should be held to violate the government's duty 
of neutrality in "its relation with .•. religious believers and 
non-believers. 1124 The establishment clause permits accommodation of 
religfon to avoid discrimination against religious beliefs and denial 
of religious freedom. What constitutes neutrality and how far the 
8 
government can accommodate religion without over stepping constitutional 
bounds are highly debatable questions having no single solution. 
22Bolling v Sharp, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), 
23constitution of the United States, First Amendment. 
24Everson v Board £f. Education, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947). 
9 
Organization 
Chapter Two defines and delineates a conscientious objector. The 
latter part of the chapter briefly traces the historical development of 
the draft laws with relation to conscientious objectors and provides 
the necessary background for an unqerstanding of how legislation and 
courts have affected their status. 
Chapter Three examines and analyzes the Court's opinion and reason-
ing in the Seeger Case and describes its effect on the status of the 
conscientious objector. It shows, among other things, the difficulty 
of distinguishing between a religious conscientious objector and a non-
religious conscientious objector. The last part of the chapter dis-
cusses the 1967 draft law amendments to the previous statutory 
provision exempting conscientious objectors and its possible effects on 
the court's judicial interpretations of the draft law vis-a-vis 
conscientious objectors. 
Chapter Four is devoted to discussing the advantages and disadvan-
tages of legally recognizing the selective conscientious objector. The 
latter part of the chapter is concerned with proposed reform of the 
draft law in order to broaden the classification to include all sincere 
conscientious objectors who oppose military service. 
Chapter Five is a summary and conclusion of the legal problems 
relating to conscientious objectors discussed in the body of the thesis. 
The conclusions will attempt to sustain the hypothesis that there is a 
judicial tendency to extend legal recognition to all conscientious 
objectors in order to insure equal treatment for those who are sincerely 
and conscientiously opposed to participation in war. 
CHAPTER II 
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS IN THE UNITED STATES 
Conscientious Obj¢ctors Defined 'and Delinea.ted 
~nerally, a conscientious objector is defined as an individual 
who refuses to serve in the military or who refuses to bear arms be-
cause it would be contrary to his religious or ·moral principles .1:J Dur-
ing World War 11 3 there were a variety of conscientious objectors who 
where identif~ed by their de$ree of participation in the military. 2 
First, there was the absolute conscientious objector who.is opposed to 
any kind of service to the United States in time of war. Second, there 
was the conscientious objector who is opposed to participating in any-
thing connected with warlike-services even in time of peace. In this 
second case, the conscientious objector was sent to perform work of 
public service under civilian direction. Third, there was the consci-
entious objector who refused to be involved in combatant activities, 
but was willing to ·serve in non-combatant activities in the military. 
Up to the present, the selective service law and the system's classi-
fication processes has recognized only the latter two types of 
.. ···~ ... ,, ...... ,._,. 
1webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary (196l)i p. 177. 
2selective Service System, Conscientious Objector, Special Mono-
graph No. 11,.Vol. I (Wasl).ington, 1950), p. 2. 
10 
11 
conscientious objectors. 3 
Conscientious objectors have been further classified according to 
the basis of their beliefs. That is, conscientious objectors have been 
generally classified as a religious, ethical, or political'' objector., 
A religious objector is one who objects to bearing arms because 
of religfous teaching and training.· An :ethical objector bases his 
objection on a pers_bnal moral code that is considered independent· 
bf· any religious J:raining or belief. The political objector is an 
individual who is not: opposed. to all wars, but only to particular 
"unjust" wars. 4 
A more detailed classification by a member of the Justice Depart-
ment during World War II divided conscientious objectors into the 
twelve classes listed below. 
1. The religious objector sincerely believes in a personal Creator 
whose immortal laws forbid the killing of human beings, particularly as 
set forth in the Commandment "Thou shalt not kill." He believes that 
war is contrary to the spirit and teachings of Christianity and in 
opposition to God's will, and he cannot participate, without subjecting 
his soul to eternal perdition. 
2. The moral or ethical objector considers war inconsistent with 
his moral philosophy and humanitarianism which is independent of 
of religious beliefs, except as it may be predicated upon a belief in 
a brotherhood of man. That concept is not based on a belief in the 
fatherhood of God. His conscience is bound by a moral law, which en-
joins him from having to do with so destructive and futile a force as 
war, which evidences a breakdown of reason by substituting force. In 
fact, most of this type of objector denies a belief in a diety except 
insofar as there may be a moral fo:r:ce in the universe, It is his view 
that mankind is sufficient to ;ltself, that it owes no obligation to any 
power except humankind, and that it may achieve perfection in and of 
itself without the interposition of any diety or supernatural power. 
3, The economic objector, as a student of history, sees all wars 
4Mittlebeeler, "Laws and the Conscientious Objector, 11 Oregon Law 
Review, XX (1941), p, 301. 
362 Stat. 612 (1967). 
12 
as based upon the inequitable distribution of natural resources, 
complicated and supported by tariff barriers, immigration restrictions 
and nationalistic control of colonial markets and sees no hope of this 
war effecting a more equitable distribution of economic opportunity. 
4. The political objector sees war as a means of exploiting the 
masses for the few who are politically ambitious, or for the govern-
ments and deceiving the people. 
5. The philosophical objector, generally a student of meta-
physics, possesses a personal philosophy which dominates his ways of 
life. 
6. The sociological objector whose objections are based upon a 
theory that war has no place in his own particular ordering of society. 
7. The i.ntern.ationalist objector would destroy or abolish all 
international boundaries and sovereignty, racial and trade lines, and 
consider the world one big family of peoples devoid of war. 
8. The personal objector, who objects to this particular war, 
because he believes it to be a war of imperialism or that the Allied 
Nations have brought it on, or that it is not the type of war in which 
he can participate. 
9. The neurotic objector has a phobia of war's atrocities, a 
mental and.physical fear and abhorrence of killing and maiming, and 
who therefore cannot participate in it. 
10. The naturalistic objector's objection is physiological, and 
based upon an abhorrence of blood. 
11. The "professional pacifist" objector whould have "peace in 
our ti.me at any cost." He would tolerate nothing which would incon-
venience his mode of living, but would aggressively limit the 
liberties of others. He wants to enjoy all the protections of the 
government, but is unwilling to bear any of the responsibilities of 
citizenship in this respect. 
12. The Jehova Witness objects to all man-made wars and Govern-
ments, but says he is not a conscientious objector to all wars, since 
he would fight and kill in defense of the Theocracy, his property and 
his brethren.5 
Conscientious objectors hold in common a tendency to refuse to 
participate in a war regardless of personal consequences. Beyond this, 
5unpublished report of the Assistant to the Attorney General, 
1945, quoted in Selective Service System, 1 Conscientious Objection 3 
(Special Monograph 11, 1950). 
13 
6 however, there are probably few convictions which they all share. For 
example, some may oppose military service only in a particular war they 
consider unjust or ,otherw,is:e: morally or ethically unsupportable while 
others may oppose military service in any war in any form. Therefore, 
grounds of conscientious objection reflect a continuum of beliefs em-
bodying religious, moral, ethical, philosophical, humanitarian, social, 
economic, and political considerations. 
Historical Outline 
A brief historical discussion of the role of the conscientious 
objector in the development. of the federal draft legislation is appro-
priate in order to determine the effects legislation has had on the 
development and progress of the conscientious objector's status. Con-
se.quently this section .is mainly directed toward a historical develop-
ment of conscientious objector'~ legislation in general, 
During the Civil War, the Union in 1864 and the Confederacy in 
1862 recognized conscientious objectors to be members of religious 
groups who were opposed to bearing arms. Initially, however, the 
Union's Dra:ft Act of 1863 did not specifically acknowledge the con-
:!j 
scientious objector, but it did provide, 
that any person drafted , , . may • • ··• furnish an acceptable 
substitute to take his place in the draft; or. he may pay ..• 
not exceeding three hundred dollars .. , for the procuration 
of such substitute .•• and thereupon such person so furnish-
the substitute, or paying the money, shall be discharged from 
:further liability under that draft , ••• 7 
6see generally 1 U. S. Selective Service System, Conscientious 
Objection 2-4 (Special Monograph No. 11, 1950); Sibley and Jacob, 
Conscription of Conscience 18-43 (1952). 
712 Stat. 733 (1863). 
14 
In 1864, the Union Congress legally and formally recognized 
religious objectors. That is, assignment to non-combatant duty for 
those objectors whose religious faith prohibited them from bearing arms, 
Specifically, the amendl.nent. to the Draft Act of 1863 provided, 
that members of religious denominations, who shall by oath 
or affirmation declare that they are conscientiously opposed 
to the bearing of arms, and who are prohibited from doing so 
by the rules and articles of faith and practice of said 
religious denominations, shall, when drafted into the mili-
tary service, be considered noncombatants, and shall be 
assigned by the Secretary of War to duty in the hospitals, 
or to the care of freedmen, or shall· pay the sum of three 
hundred dollars .•• to be applied to the benefit of the 
8 sick and wounded soldiers . 
The Confederate Congress initially passed a draft law in April, 
1862 which did not specifically acknowledge the conscientious objector. 
Exemption was~ however, provided for those who supplied a substitute. 
No special consideration was given to io the religious objector until 
October, 1862. The Act of 1862 contained the following draft 
exemption: 
All persons who have been and are now members of the Society 
of Friends, and the Association of Dunkards~ Nazarenes, 
Mennonists in regular membe.rship in their respective denomi"" 
nations: Provided, Members of the Society of Friends, 
Nazarenes, Mennonists and Dunkards shall furnish substitutes 
or pay a tax of five hundred dollars each into the public 
treasury.9 
At the onset of World War I, the United States Selective Draft Act 
of 1917 eliminated the provision for substitution or commutation fee 
and exempted from combatant duty those who were members of "any well-
recognized religious sect" opposed to participating "in war in any 
813 Stat. 9 (1864)~ 
9 Confederate States of America, The Statutes at Large, (1861~1864), 
p. 78, quoted in Selective Service System, Conscientious Objector, 
Special Monograph No. 11, Vol. I (Washington, 1950), p. 45. 
form," lO Specifically, the 1917 Draft Act provided the following: 
nothing·· in this Act shall be construed to require or compel 
any person to serve in any of the forces herein provided 
for who i.s found to be a member of.any well-recognized 
religious sect or organization at present organized and 
existing and whose existing creed or principles forbid 
its members to participate in war in any form and whose 
religious convictions are against war or participation 
therein in accordance with the creed or principles of 
said religious organizations, but no person so exempted 
shall be·exempted from service in any capacity that the 
President shall declare to be non-combatant; . 11 
15 
Because of the difficulty in determining which sect would quality 
under the nar:tow term of the "religious sect" requirement of the 1917 
Draft Act, President Wilson issued an executive order allowing con-
scientious objectors, who opposed combatant service either on religious 
12 
or other grounds, to be ass:i.g,~ed non-combatant duty. No provisions, 
however, was made for those conscientious objectors who objected to 
both combatant and non-combatant military service. Congress, in March, 
1918, passed a Farm Furlough Act which gave the Secretary of War the 
h f 1 h . 1 1 . 13 aut ority to ur oug servicemen to agricu tura services. Fur;. 
laughs were granted to those registrants reconunended by the Board of 
Inquiry who proved to be sincere in their claim to be opposed to any 
14 
service with the armed·forces. 
15 The Supreme Court., in the Selective. Draft Law Cases of 1918, 
l040 Stat. 78 (1917). 
lllbid. 
12Executive Order No. 2823 (March 20, 1918). 
1340 Stat. 450 (1918). 
14Mulford Q. Sibley and Phillip E; Jacobs, Conscription of Con-
scien~e (New York, 1952), pp. 11-12. 
15245 u. s. 366 (1918). 
16 
upheld the power of Congress to compel military service by selective 
draft under the war powers without considering the rights of conscien-
tious objectors. Between World War I and World War II, the Supreme 
Court generally decided in several cases that refusal to bear arms on 
conscientious grounds is not a constitutional right, but a congres.-
sional privilege. For example, although it was argued in United States 
Macintosh16 "that a citizen cannot be forced and need not bear arms v 
in a war if he has concientious religious scruples against doing so, 1117 
the Court further stated that exemption from military service on relig-
ious grounds was based on congressional policy rather than of consti-
tional right. 18 
The Draft Act of 1940, 19 exempting conscientious objectors, con-
tained many substantial changes from the Draft Act of 1917. For exam-
ple, the statute eliminated the requirement that cnnscientious objec-
tors must be members of a recognized pacifist sect. If an individual 
personally objected to participating in war in any form based on 
"religious training and belief," he would be exempt from combat duty 
under the act: 
Nothing contained in this act shall be construed to 
require any person to be subject to combatant training and 
service in the land or naval forces of the United Stat.es 
16283 u. s. 605 (1931). 
17:i;bid., p. 623 
18The Macintosh ~was overruled by Girouard v United States, 
328 u. w. 61 (1946). 
1954 Stat. 885 (1940). 
who, by reason of religious training and belief, is con- 20 
scientiously opposed to participation in war in any form. 
Furthermore, the statute provided that conscientious objectors 
17 
could satisfy their obligation for service in one of two ways. First, 
those who were opposed to combat duty but not to service in the armed 
forces would be assigned noncombat duty prescribed by the President. 21 
Second, those who were opposed to any service under the military were 
assigned to "work of national importance under civilian direction. 1122 
The objectors who were opposed to any type of compulsory military ser-
vice, however, were not exempted, nor ·were any provisions made for the 
absolutist who refused to register. These objectors were violating the 
law and were subsequently penalized. 
The last part of the statute provided for appeal boards and 
Depart:ment of Justice hearings for those conscientious objectors whose 
claims were not recognized by the local boards. Section 11. of the 1940 
Draft Act provided that no person should be tried by a military or 
naval court: martial in any case unless such person had actually been 
. d d ' h d f 23 in ucte. into t e arme · ore.es. 
any person or persons who shall knowi.ngly hinder or 
interfere in any way by force or by violence with the 
administration of this act or the rules or regulations 
made pursuant thereto, or conspire to do so, shall upon 
conviction in the district court of the United States 
having jurisdiction thereof, be punished by imprisonment 
20selective Training and Service Act of 1940, Section 5 (g). 
(Pub. L. No. 783, 76th Congress, 2nd Session). 
21Executive Order No. 8606 (December 6, 1940). 
22selective Training and Service Act of 1940, Section 5 (g). 
(Pub. L. No. 783, 76th Congress, 2nd Session). 
23 54 Stat. 894 (1940), 50 U. S. C. App 311 (1946). 
for not more than 5 years or a fine of not more than 
$10,000, or both such fine and imprisonment, or if 
subject to military or naval law may be tried by court 
martial, and, on conviction, shall suffer such punish-
ment as a court martial in any case arising under this 
act unle.ss such person has been actually inducted for 
the training and service prescribed under this act or 
unless he is subject to trial by court martial under 
laws in force prior to the ·enactment of this act. 
Precedence shall be giveR by courts to.the trial cases 
arising under this act. 2 
18 
Section 11 of the 1940 Draft Act represented a complete change from the 
procedure under the 1917 Draft Act which provided that the consci-
entious objector from th'e· time of his orders to report for induction to 
the ti.me of his discharge was a member of the military service and thus 
subject to military law. 
There are certain qualifications under section 5 (g) of the Draft 
Act that a conscientious objector must meet in order to be exempted 
from the military service. One qualification for exemption specifies 
that a registrant must be opposed nto war in any form." A local board-, 
whose primary responsibility is· classifying registrants, may interpret 
this qualific:ati:on·i.n various ways. For example, some boards granted 
exemption to those registrants who were sincere in morally objecting 
to the current war, while others granted exemptions only to those 
25 
registrants who opposed all wars, 
Similarly, another qualification for exemption specifying "religi-
ous training and belief" was also narrowly and broadly interpreted Troy 
26 by local boards. For e.xample, some boards defined religion to mean 
24 Ibid. 
25Si.bley, pp. 67-68. 
261bid. 
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an outward expression of church attendance or church affiliation, while 
other boards interpreted religion to mean an inward expression based on 
philosophical~ political, or humanitarian beliefs. In addition, local 
boards were also guided to some extent by directives from the National 
headquarters of Selective Service System. For example, General Hershey 
defined religion to be based on the recognition of some source of all 
existence which is divine because it is the source of all things. 1127 
Subsequently, local boards became less liberal and those objectors who 
were sincere in morally objecting to all wars although not believing in 
a Divine Creator could not under the Hershey ruling be classified as 
" 0 b' 28 conscientious o Jectors. 
Soon afterwards, the courts in a number of decisions resolved the 
me.aning of who "by reli.gious training and belief• is conscientiously 
opposed to participation in war in any form ...• " Beginning with 
United Stat:es.v Kauten, 29 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld 
the local board's denial of requested classification based on the· 
ground that Kauten was a political objector and not a religious, 
objector. 
There is a distinction between a course of reasoning 
resulting in a conviction that a particular war is inexpedi-
ent or disastrous and a conscientious objector to partici-
pation in any war under any circumstances. The latter, and 
not the former, may be the basis of exemption under the act. 
The former is usually a political objection, while the latter• 
we think, may justif:iably be regarded as a response of the 
27Letter to Department of Justice, March 5, 1942, quoted in Julien 
Cornell, "Exemption from the Draft: A Study in Civil Liberties," Yale 
Law Journal, January, 1947, p. 269. 
28Sibley, pp 67-68. 
2\33 F. (2d) 703, (C.C.A. 2d, 1943). 
individual to an inward mentor, call it conscience or God, 
that is for many persons at the present time the equivalent 
of what has always been thought. a religious impulse.30 
20 
In addition, the court discussed the meaning of "religious train-
ing .and belief" in the following paragraph: 
It is unnecessary to .attempt a definition of religion; 
the content of the term is found in the history of the 
human race and is incapable of compression into a few words, 
Religious belief arises from a sense of the inadequacy of 
reason as a means of relating the individual to his fellow-
man and to his universe - a sense connnon to men in the most 
primitive and in the most highly civilized societies. It 
accepts the aid of logic but refuses to be limited by it. 
It is a belief :f;inding expression in a conscience which 
categorically requires the believer to disregard elementary 
self-interest and to accept martyrdom in preference to trans-
gressing its tenets 31 
32 In United States ~ rel Phillips v Downer, however, the court 
based its decision on a different concept of what is meant by "religi- ·· 
ous training and belief" than that proposed in the Kaut.en Case. The 
court held that Phillips, who objected primarily on ethical and humani-
tarian grounds, was entitled to an exemption. The court advocated that 
"if a stricter rule than was announced in the Kaut.en case is called 
for, one demanding a belief which cannot be found among the philoso-
phers, but oniy among religious teachers of recognized organizations, 
then we are.substantially or nearly back to the requirement of the Act 
.. 33 
of 1917 
, ' The view that sincere philosophical, moral, or 
humanitarian beliefs met the statutory requirements was maintained in 
30 .. ··-· -· 
Ibid., p. 708 
31Ibid. 
32135 F. 2d 521 (2d Cir. 1943). 
33 "•"• .. "• 
. Ibid., p. 524. 
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several other similar cases that were dealt with by the Second Circuit 
34 Court of Appeals, One is not surprised that the·local boards were 
somewhat confused as to the precise definition of religious training 
and belief and to the qualification requirements of conscientious 
objectors. 
A few years later, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted a 
view regarding the meaning of "religious training and belief" contrary 
to that exhibited by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, In Berman v 
lJ · d s- 35 h h ld h . . . f. n1.te Lates, t e court e t at conscientious exemption rom 
military service must be based on a belief in a deity and not on a 
Hperson's philosophy of life or his devotion to human welfare 
Specifically, the court said: 
It is our opinion that the expression ilby reason of 
religious training and belief" is plain langua;ge, and was 
written into the statute for the specific purpose of dis-
tinguishing between a conscientious social belief, or a 
high moralistic philosophy, and one based upon an indi~· 
vidual's belief in his responsibility to an authority 
higher and beyond any worldly one.37 
1136 
Although the court affirmed Berman's conviction, the discrepancy 
betwe.en the Second and Ninth Circuit Courts was not resolved until 1948 
when Congress incorporated the 1940 Draft Act standard for conscientious: 
34united States ex rel Reel v Badt, 141 F. 2d 845 (2d cir. 1944); 
Qg_ited States ex rel Brandonv .Downer, 139 F. 2d 761 (2d ctr: 1944) 
cl.ictum. 
35 156 F. 2d 377 (9th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 795 (1946). 
36 ... 
378, Ibid., p. 
37 -- -
380, Ibid., p, 
objectors in the Selective Service Act of 1948: 38 
Nothing contained in this title shall be construed to 
require any person to be subject to combatant training 
and service in the armed forces of the United States 
who, by reason of religious training and belief, is 
conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any 
form , • , , 3 9 
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In addition to the above classification, Congress further included 
in the Draft Act of 1948 a definition of what is meant by "religious 
training and belief" that was to be used by the Selective Service 
System in considering claims for conscientious objector classification, 
That is, 
Religious training and belief in this connetion means an 
individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being in-
volving .duties superior to those arising from any human 
relation, but .does not include essentially political, 
sociological, or·philosophical views or a merely personal 
moral code, Any person , , , whose claim is sustained , , 
shall, if he is inducted into the armed ·forces •.•• be as-
signed to noncombatant· service as defined by.the President, 
or shall, if he is found to be conscientiously opposed to 
particie5tion in such noncombatant service, be deferred 
Congress did not mention the discrepancy between the Second 
Circuit Court opinion and the Ninth Circuit Court opinion. Neverthe-
less, the Senate Armed Services Committee, paraphrasing the Berman Case 
and Chief Justice Hughes' definition in the Macintosh Case, observed 
that: 
This section reenacts substantially the same provisions as 
were found in subsection 5 (g) of the 1940 Act, Exemption 
extends to anyone who, because of religious training and 
38selective Service Act of 1948 (Universal Military Training and 
Service Act) Section 6 (j), 62 Stat, 612-13 1 as amended, 50 U"S,C, 
App 456 (j) (1964) , 
39Ibid, 
40 . 62 Stat, 612. (1948) 50 U,S,C, App 456 (j) (Supp, 1950). 
1, .. 
belief in his relationship to a Supreme Being~ is consci-
entiously opposed to combatant military service or to both 
combatant and noncombatant military service. (See United 
.States v Berman, 156 F (2) 377, cert. denied, 329 U. S. 
795)41 
23 
The Selective Service Act of 1948, on one hand, was an advancement 
because it provided a deferment to religious conscientious objectors. 
On the other hand, however, it narrowly defined religion which subse-
quently left little room for administrative interpretation, and allowed 
no recognition for the non-religious objector. 
Congress appeared to be entering into an area forbidden by the 
Constitution. That is, Congress may have· been violating the First 
Amendment's Establishment and Free Exercise Clause by defining religion 
and by preferring those religions that profess a belief in a Supreme 
42 Being. "Congress ·shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .. 43 In 
addition, Congress may have been violating the ·guarantee ·of equal 
protection of law implicit within the due process clause of the Fifth 
Amendment by discriminating between different forms of religious ex-
pression.44 "Discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be a. 
45 
violative of due process. Therefore, this provision of the Act of 
41 S. Rep. No. 1268, 80th Congress 2d Session 14 (1948). 
42u ·· as t s nice. ta es v eeger, 326 F. 2d 846 (2d Cir. 1964), 380 U, S. 
163 (1965). 
43united St.ates Constitution, amendment L 
44united States v Seeger, 32-6 F. 2d 846 (2d Cir. 1964), 380 U. S. 
163 (1965). 
45Bolling v Sharp, 347 U. S. 497 (1954). 
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1948 dealing with "religious training and belief" later became the 
b . t f 1 d 1 1 · · 46 su Jee o severa court cases an ega interpretations, 
The provision of the 1948 Draft Act dealing with complete defer- . 
ment of objectors who objected to noncombatant duty was amended in the 
Draft Act of 195L 47 The Draft Act of. 1951 state$ that if a person "is 
found to be conscientiously opposed to participation in such induction, 
be ordered by his local board, subject to such regulations as the 
President may prescribe, to perform . . , such civilian work contrib-
uting to the maintenance of the national health, safety, or interest as 
the local board may deem appropriate • • .. 48 Therefore, persons who 
object to combatant duty may be assigned to noncombatant duty in the 
armed service and those who object to noncombant duty may be assigned 
two years of civilian work which is in the national interest. 
Some of the most difficult administrative problems in the Selec-
tive Service Act of 1948 involve the local board's review and classi-
fication of each conscientious objector. That is, local boards have 
had to deal with each and every conscientious objector's case individ-
ually in order to determine if he qualifies for conscientious dhjec,;.. 
tor I s status under the requirements of the draft. . For those c,,0t1sc ir-
entious objectors whose claims were denied recognition by the local 
boards, a comple::x. review procedure and a hearing before the Justice 
Department were provided. 
46PetervUnited States, 324 F. 2d 173 (9th Cir. 1963), United 
States ~ob~on, 325 F, 2d 409 (2d Cir. 1963), United States v Seeger 
326 F. 2d 846 (2d Cir. 1964), 
4 \5 Stat. 75 (1951), 50 tJ ,S ,C .A. App 45 et seq. (1951). 
4865 Stat. 86 (1951), 50 u.s.c.A. App 456 (j) (1951). 
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49 In United States v Seeger, the Second Circuit reversed a denial 
of exemption to Seeger, holding that the due process clause of the 
Fifth Amendment requires equal treatment of all persons who have con-
scientious objections based on religious beliefs, including non-theistic 
beliefs. 50 Seeger, who did not believe in the existence of God, claimed 
conscientious objec·tor' s exemption on the basis of the "welfare of 
humanity and the pre·servation of democratic values 1151 In a 
letter to his draft board, Seeger wrote: 
My decision ard.ses from what I believe ·to be consider-
ations of validity from the standpoint of the welfare ·of 
humanity and the pre·servation of the democratic values which 
we in the United States are struggling to maintain. I have 
concluded that war, from the practical standpoint, is futile 
and self-defeating, and that from the more important moral 
standpoint, it is unethical. 52 · 
The Supreme Court in 1965 affirmed the Second Circuit Court's 
judgment, but not on constitutional grounds. Instead, the Court 
broadly interpreted the Statute's concept of "religious training and 
belief" to those conscientious objectors who hold "a sincere and mean-
ingul belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place paral-
lel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the 
t . ' 1153 exemp ion. 
In summary, this review has shown that the Federal government 
4965 Stat. 75 (1951), 50 u.s.c.A. App 45 et seq. (1951). 
so~. 
p. 848. 
52 Ibid. 
53380 U. S. 176 (1965). This case will be more thoroughly dis-
cussed and analyzed in the next chapter. 
26 
through the yea:1::--s has expressed some ·recognition and consideration 
for religious beliefs, and has provided some kinds of exemptions to 
-conscientious objectors from participating -in the military service. In 
addition, there has been evidence of conflicting views between con-
gressional intent and the ·court's opinions regarding the meaning and 
scope of "religious training and belief" affecting the status of 
conscientious objector-s. 
CHAPTE.R I II 
CONSCIENCE, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE SUPREME COURT 
This chapter describes, analyzes and examines the Court's opinion 
and reasoning in United States v Seeger. In addition, this chapter 
discusses the meanings of parious terms enacted in the draft act of 
1948 exempting conscientious objectors, and describes some of the 
justifications involved in exempting the conscientious objector. 
Finally, it discusses the constitutionality of the draft laws and the 
objector's provisions. 
United States v Seeger 
The question raised before the Supreme Court in United States v 
Seeger was whether or not the section providing for exemption of any 
person "who by religious training and belief", which is defined as 
"an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving 
duties superior to those arising from any human relation", was consti~ 
tutional in view of the religious clauses of the First Amendment and 
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.1 
Seeger was convicted in the District Court of New York of having 
refused to submit to induction in the armed forces. He registered in 
-1953 and was classified 1-A. Four years later, he claimed exemption 
1380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
27 
28 
as a ccmscientious objector. He refused to relate his convictions to a 
"belief in a Supreme Being" because of his skepticism in the existence 
of a God, .. Nevertheless, his beliefs were found to be sincere and 
based on his religious training and belief which included research into 
religious fields. The Justice Department, however, rejected Seeger's 
claim for exemption because his objections were not based on religious 
training and belief in relation to a Supreme Being. The defense, in 
the district court trial, argued that the classification in the Selec-
tive Service Act is unreasonable and arbitrary in violation of the 
Fifth and First Amendments, The district court contented that section 
6 (j) was constitutional and Seeger was convicted, The Court of 
Appeals for the Se~ond Circuit reversed his conviction on the basis that 
the Supreme Being requirement of the law'created a classification that 
-
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment makes impermissible, 
That is, "it distinguished between internally de.rived and externally 
compelled beliefs, 112 
Like Seeger, both Jakobson and Peter had been convicted in district 
courts for refusing to submit to induction. They both maintained that 
they were entitled to exemption under section 6 (j). Seeger, on the 
other hand, claimed that section 6 (j) was unconstitutional. While 
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Court upheld the conviction 
of Peter, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed Jakob-
son's conviction finding that his claim came within statutory require-
ments of section 6 (j) and reversed Seeger's conviction on broad 
2 . . 
326 F. 2d 853 (2d Cir, 1964). 
constitutional grounds declaring the section of the federal statute 
unconstitutional. 3 
In the Supreme Court, Seeger challenged section 6 (j) under the 
religious clauses of the First Amendment and the due process clause 
29 
of the Fifth Amendment. First, Seeger contended that the section pre-
ferring certain kinds of religious based on the belief in a Supreme 
Being over other kinds of religious based on non-Supreme Being beliefs 
was contrary to the establishment clause of the First Amendment. 
Second, exempting certain kinds of conscientious objectors who profess 
belief in a Supreme Bein~while denying it to others who profess 
different ki.nds of religious beliefs was in violation of the free 
exercise clause of the First Amendment. Third, the section exempting 
conscientious objectors of the 1948 draft act is arbitrary because it 
discriminates among different forms of religious beliefs and expressions 
which violates the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, 
In this case the Supreme Court avoided deciding the constitutional 
questions posed by See.ger by adhering to the rules aimed at encouraging 
judicial self-restraint. T~at is, the court applied the rule that it 
would not "formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is 
required by the precise facts to which it is applied,",and the rule 
that when "the validity of an act of Congress is drawn in question, 
and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a 
cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a 
3Peter v United States, 324 F. 2d 173 (9th Cir. 1963); 
United States v Jakobson, 325 F. 2d 409 (2d Cir, 1963); 
United States v Seeger, 326 F. 2d 846 (2d Cir. 1964). 
construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question 
may be avoided. 114 Thus, the Court saved section 6 (j) of the 1948. 
I 
v 
Military Selective Service Act through statutory interpretation. 
The Court contended that Congress was clarifying the meaning of 
"religious training and belief" by using "~upreme Being" in order to 
30 
embrace all religion and to exclude essentially political, sociological, 
or philosophical views. 115 Further, the intention of the 1948 Act, re-
quiring a conscientious objector's exemption to be based on religious 
beliefs, was essentially the same as the 1940 Act. Supporting this 
contention, the Court stated 
The Senate Report on the bill specifically 
states that 6 (j) was intended to re-enact 
"substantially the same provisions as were found" 
in the 1940 Act. That statute, of course, refer~ 
to "religious training and belief" .without more. 
In view of the reenactment of the 1940 Act in the 1948 Act, the 
Court stated that "religious training and belief" was the only require-
ment applicable to conscientious objector's exemption. This require-
ment was liberally interpretated, however, and Seeger was exempted 
because he met the criteria set forth by the statute. 
Within that phrase would come all sincere religious 
beliefs which are based upon a power or being, or 
upon a faith, to which all else is subordinate or 
upon which all else is ultimately dependent. The 
test might be stated in these words: A sincere 
and meaningful belief which occupies in the life 
of its possessor a place parallel to that filled 
by God of those admittedly qualifying for the 
4 Ashwander v T.V.A., 297 U.S. 288 (1936) 
5rbid., 165 
6Ibid., 176 
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. . h 0 h t d f" · · 7 exemption comes wit int es atutory e inition •. 
According to the Court, "parallel to that filled by God" cannot 
be narrowly confined to traditional concepts of religion, but instead, 
must be broad enough to embrace "the beliefs of different individuals 
8 
who will articulate them in a multitude of ways. 11 
The validity of what he believes cannot be questioned 
As Mr. Justice Douglas stated in United States v 
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944): "Men may believe what 
they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of 
their religious doctrines or beliefs. Religious experiences 
which are as real as life to some may be incomprehensible 
to others." Local boards and courts in this sense are not 
free to reject beliefs because they consider them "incompre-
hensible," Their task is to decide whether the beliefs 
professed by the registrant are sincerely held a9d whether 
they are in his own scheme of things, religious. 
The statute, however, excludes those beliefs based on a "merely 
personal code." "The use by Congress of the words 'merely personal' 
appears to restrict the exception to a moral code whr'ch is not only 
personal but which is the sole basis for the registrants beliefs and 
is in no way related to a Supreme Being. It follows, therefore, that 
if the claimed religious beliefs of the respective registrants in 
these cases meet the test that we lay down their objections cannot be 
10 based on a "merely personal" moral code." 
In summary, the Supreme Court directed that local boards and 
courts should first decide whether the objector's belief is sincere and 
honest. That is, does.the objector truly hold the belief he professes 
7rbid. 
8Ibid., p. 184. 
91bid., pp, 184-185 
10Ibid., p. 186 
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to hold, Second, the local board and courts should decide whether the 
objector's belief, in his own scheme of things, is religious within 
the meaning of the section 6 (j). That is, does the objector's belief 
occupy "a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by 
the orthodox belief in God. 1111 In this sense, the Supreme Court 
recognized that there is a "broad spectrum of religious beliefs" deman-
d • 0 h II b h d l" 0 0 1112 strate in various ways tat em race t e mo ern re igious community. · 
Therefore, local boards and courts should not "require proof" of 
religious beliefs nor "reject beliefs" because they find them "incompre-
. hensible" •13 Finally, the Supreme Court stated that "exemption does 
not cover those who oppose war from a merely personal moral code, nor 
those who decide that war is wrong on the basis of essentially politi-
cal, sociological or economic considerations rather than religious 
beliefs, 1114 
Religious Objector and the Non-Religious Objector 
The language of section 6 (j) relating to conscientious objectors 
provides little assistance in unde.rstanding the distinctions between 
conscientious objection and objections based on other grounds. Al-
though the Supreme Court approved a broad definition of religion in the 
Seeger Case, does the Court's opinion imply any recognition of a con-
scientious objector whose objection to participation in war is not 
11Ibid., p. 166. 
12rbid., pp, 180-183 
13Ibid. , p. 163 
14Ibid. 
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based on religious grounds? Is it possible to distinguish between a 
religious conscientious objector and a non-religious conscientious 
objector? Some of the language in the Seeger Case provides a distinc-
tion between religious and non-religious objectors, while other parts 
of the opinion leave little in the way of a clear distinction. 
The Court considered Seeger to be a "religious" objector even 
though the government argued that because Seeger denied belief in a 
Supreme Being, his objection was based on "essentially political, 
15 
sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code." 
In short, the government regarded Seeger to be a "non-religious" 
objector. The Court, however, stressed the point that there was no 
issue between theism and atheism involved in the case. "Nor do the 
parties claim the monotheistic belief that there is but one God; 
what they claim (with the possible exception of Seeger who bases his 
position here not on factual but on purely constitutional grounds) is 
that they adhere to theism, as opposed to atheism , , • 1116 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals considered Seeger to be "non-
theistically religious" which is consistent with the earlier definition 
17 
contained in the Kauten Case. That is, the court in the Kauten 
Case states 
The provisions of the present statute 
take into account the characteristics of a skeptical 
15R 1 ep Y 
No. 50), pp. 
(1965). 
Brief --f-0-rc----t-he----Uni-t-ed S-t-at-es- as Petitioner (Seeger, 
2-3, United States v Seeger, 380 U. S. 163 
16380 U.S. p. 174 
17 U~i ~~J' ~-;~~-~-~- v Seeger, 326 F. 2d 846, 853-54 (2d Cir, 
1964). 
generation and make the existence of a conscientious 
scruple against war in any form, rather than allegiance 
to a definite religious group or creed, the basis of 
exemption o ••• A compelling voice of conscience .•• 
we should regard as a religious impulse ••• a response 
of the individual to an inward mentor, call it conscience 
or God, that is for many persons at the present time the 
:quivalej§ of what has always been thought a religious 
impulse. 
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Therefore, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in the Seegar Case 
held that 
Kauten's broad definition embraced the recognition 
that "religion could not be confined to a belief in a 
supernatural power: That today, a pervading commitment 
to a moral idea is for many the equivalent of what 19 
historically considered the response to divine commands. 
But, as Dean Harlan Fiske Stone (later associate and Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court) pointed out, conscience may be. derived from a moral, 
ethical or philosophical source instead of a religious source. Thus, 
the Supreme Court chose to regard Stone's statement as the rationale 
underlying the conscientious objector's recognition. As quoted by the 
Court, Chief Justice Stone wrote: 
Both morals and sound policy require that the state 
should not violate the conscience of the individual. 
All our history gives confirmation to the view that 
liberty of conscience has a moral and social value which 
makes it worthy of preservation at the hands of the state. 
So deep in its significance and vital, indeed, is it to 
the integrity of man's moral and spiritual nature that 
nothing short of the self-preservation of the state should 
warrant its violation; and it may well be questioned 
whether the state which preserves its life by a settled 
policy of violation of the consci~hce of the indivi2tlal 
will not in fact ultimately lose it by the process. 
18united States v Kauten, 133F. (2d) 703, 708 (C.C.A. 2d, 1%3). 
19Ibid, 
20380 U.S. at p. 170. Stone: The Conscientious Objector, ?1 
Columbia University Quarterly, 253, 269 (1919). 
The Court placed Stone's liberal statement regarding the freedom 
of conscience side by side with Mro Chief Justice Charles E. Hughes' 
narrowly confined statement of conscience, 
Chief Justice Hughes •• , enunciated the rationale 
behind the long recognition of cqnscientious objection, 
accorded by Congress , , • when he declared that 'in the 
forum of conscience, duty to a moral P2yer higher than 
the State has always been maintained,' 
This dissent by Chief Justice Hughes was concerned not only with the 
admission to citizenship of religious objectors, but it was also the 
source of the definition "belief in relation to a Supreme Being." 
35 
Another unclear passage in the Seeger Case is the test provided by 
the Court to be used to determine whether a belief meets the require,-
men ts of Section 6 (j). · That is, "whether a given belief that is 
sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of the possessor 
parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clec1,rly 
qualifies for an exemption. 1122 Although the Court contends that this 
"test is simple of application" and is "essentially an objective one", 
it is difficult to understand clearly what is meant by the phrase 
"occupies a place in the life of the poss'?ssor." In what sense does 
a belief "occupy a place", since there are a variety of value systems 
or beliefs which could be considered equivalent in theory, Perhaps 
what the Court meant was that the religious character of a belief is 
determined not so much by the place it does occupy in the life of the 
possessor as by the place it ought to occupy in his life. For example, 
21380 U.S. at p, 169-70, quoting from United States v Macintosh, 
283 U.S. 605, 633 (1931) Hughes, C. J,, dissenting). 
22Ibid., p, 166. 
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a man may hold what the Court describes as an orthodox belief in God, 
which clearly qualifies as a religious belief under section 6 (j) even 
though the man's belief may not have any marked effect on his conduct. 
The fact that a belief does occupy an important place in an objector's 
life may be some.indication that it is a belief of a sufficiently funda-
mental character to warrant characterization as a religious belief. 
It is the fundamental character of the truths asserted, and the fact 
they address themselves to basic questions about the nature of reality 
and the meaning of human existence, that is the primary reason for 
characterizing a belief in these truths as religious. The Court some-
what adhered to this type of reasoning when it described religious 
beliefs as that "based upon a power or being, or.upon a faith, to which 
all else is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately depen-
23 dent." Therefore, it seems the point of the Court's test is that if 
any given set of beliefs assumes sufficient importance in the individ-
ual's life to impose on him the duty of refraining from participation 
in any war, then these beliefs can be considered "religious" as used in 
the statute. 
In conclusion, there seems to be little difference between a 
religious objector and a non-religious objector. Thus, the question 
arises: why is.a conscientious objector, who by reason of the fact 
that his objection is founded on beliefs ab,;mt. the fundamental nature 
of reality and meaning of human existence, not necessarily a "religious" 
objector? Attempting to appraise the validity of arguments made on 
behalf of the religious and the non-religious conscientious objector, 
23Ibid., p. 176 
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one enters into an area in which judgments are subjective and the mean-
ing of terms debatable, especially if administrative officials and 
courts incorporate their personal beliefs into the interpretation of 
statutory language. Consequently, it would be difficult to formulate a 
sound basis for a distinction between the two classes of objectors (the 
religious and the non-religious) and difficult to reconcile such judg-
ments on the part of the government with respect to the religious 
clauses of the First Amendment, 
Constitutional Issues 
It was pointed out earlier in this chapter that the Supreme Court 
in Seeger avoided deciding constitutional issues and resolved the case 
on statutory interpretation, The Court avoided deciding the constitu-
tional questions by adhering to the rules aimed at encouraging judicial 
self-restraint. That is, the Court applied the rule that it would not 
"formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the 
precise facts to which it is applied," .. and the rule that when "the 
validity of an -act of Congress is drawn in question, and even if a 
seriou,s doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle 
that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the 
statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided. 1124 
It is a sound principle that the Court should avoid deciding constitu-
tional issues if the case can be disposed of by means of statutory 
interpretation,. The Supreme Court realizes its power to construe the 
Constitution, particularly, its power to declare acts of Congress 
24 Ashwander v T.V.A., 297 U.S. 288 (1936). 
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unconstitutional. This power, therefore, must be exercised with great 
restraint. Consequently, the Court approaches constitutional questions 
with reluctance, and decides cases on constitutional issues only if 
there seems to be no suitable alternative. The question remains, 
however, should constitutional issues be. avoided at the cost of an 
ambiguous and strained construction of the statute. even if the party 
chose to base "his position .. , not on factual but pure],y constitu-
25 tional groundso" If the statute had been interpreted differently, 
the Court may have found the statute to be discriminating against 
"those who embrace one religious faith rather than another", thus 
violating the free-exercise clause of the First Amendment and the due 
26 process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Further, does the exemption 
from compulsory military service for reasons of cqnscientious objection 
afford any constitutional protection? In order to answer this question, 
one must first determine the government's power to compel military 
service, the constitutional power of Congress to refus·e to exempt all 
conscientious objectors, and the constitutional right of Congress to 
grant exemption to one class of conscientious objectors and not others. 
First, the United States Government has the power to compel mili-
tary service. The authority to conscript men is based on the congres-
sional power to "declare war", "raise and support armies", "make rules" 
for governing the land and naval forces supported by the "necessary 
and proper" clause of the Constitution. 27 The Court's decis:i.on in the 
25united States v Seegar, 380 U.S. 174 
26Ibid., p. 188. 
27 ----,------.. ·---------.---· -------.------
Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366; 38 S. _Ct. 159; 
62 L Ed, 349 (1918). 
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Selective Draft Law Cases28 of 1918 was unanimous. Chief Justice White, 
writing the opinion, ruled that compulsory military service is neither 
repugnant to a free government nor in conflict with the constitutional 
guarantee of individual liberty. Chief Justice White wrote 
Finally, as we are unable to conceive upon what 
theory the exaction by government from the citizen of 
the performance of his supreme and noble duty of con-
tributing to the defense of the rights and honor of 
the nation, as the result of a war declared by the great 
representative body of the people, can be said to be the 
imposition of involuntary servitude in violation of the 
prohibition of the Thirteenth Amendment, we are con-
strained to the conclusion that the contz~tion to that 
effect is refuted by its mere statement, 
The Court in Jacobson v Massachusetts30 stated that: 
[A person] may be compelled, by force if need be, 
against his will and without regard to his personal 
wishes or his pecuniary interests, or even his religious 
or political convictions, to take his place in the ranks 
of the army of his countr~1and risk the chance of being 
shot down in its defense, 
Further, the assertion that conscientious objectors have a consti-
tutional right to exemption from conscription was rejected by Mr. 
Justice George Sutherland in the Macintosh Case. 
The conscientious objector is relieved from the 
obligation to bear arms in obedience to no constitu-
t:i.onal provision, express or implied; but because, and 
only because, it has accorded with the policy of Congress 
thus relieve him . . • . The privilege of the native 
born conscientious objector to avoid bearing arms comes 
not from the Constitution, but from the exemption as in 
28245 U.S. 380. 
29245 U.S. 380. 
30197 U.S. 11 (1905). This case.concerned the constitutionality 
of a compulsory vaccination law. The quotation concerning compelled 
military service was merely dictum, and was made simply as part of the 
supporting reasoning. 
31rbid., p. 29 (dictum). 
its wisdom it sees fit; and if it be withheld, the native-
born conscientious objector cannot successfully assert the 
privilege. No other conclusion is compatible with the well-
nigh limitless extent of the war powers ••• which include, 
by necessary implication, the power, in the last extremity, 
to compel the armed service of any citizen in the land, 
without regard to his objections or his views in respect of 
the just!2e or morality of the particular war or of war in 
general. 
This decision in the Macintosh Case, as well as the decision in 
the Selective Draft Law Cases, offer support for the contention that 
Congress is not constitutionally required to exempt ·c'on:sciehtio:'iis 
objectors, and that conscientious objectors do not have a constitu-
tional right to exemption. The Court, in 1934 pointed out that: 
From the beginnings of our history , .. conscientious 
objectors have ~3en exempted as an act of grace from military 
service, 
Thus, between World War I and World War II, the Supreme Court 
40 
decided several cases which generally established that refusal to bear 
arms on conscientious.grounds is not.a constitutional right, but.only 
a privilege which Congress may grant or withhold, 
The most frequent analogies used to justify the religious draft 
exemption are the cases dealing with naturalization. Two leading de-
cisions in this field are United States v Macintosh34 and United States 
Sh . 35 v c :wimmer. In these cases, pacifists were refused citizenship 
32united States v Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 623-24 (1931) (dictum). 
33Hamilton v Regents of the University £f. California, 293 U.S. 245, 
266 (1934), Even though their faith condemned war and training for war, 
students in a state university discovered that they could not demand 
exemption from a required course of military training. 
342s3 u.s. 605 (1931). 
35279 U.S. 644 (1929). 
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because they would not be willing to bear arms in support of national 
security. Mr. Justice George Sutherland stated in the Macintosh Case: 
"Naturalization i.s a privilege, to be given qualified or withheld as 
Congress may determineo 1136 
The Macintosh Case, however, was overruled by Girouard v United 
37 States, The Court, relying on Chief Justice Charles E, Hughes dis-
sent in the Macintosh Case, held that refusal to promise to take up 
arms did not indicate a lack of attachment to our institutions, nor 
render a person incapable of taking an oath of allegiance, Although 
the specific issue before the court in the Girouard Case concerned re-
quirements of the naturalization oath in the Nationality Act of 1940, 
the Court, nevertheless, took the opportunity to declare: 
The struggle for religious liberty has in the 
centuries been an effort to accomodate the 
demands of the State to the conscience of the 
individual, The victory for freedom of thought 
recorded in our Bill of Rights recognizes that in 
the domain of conscience there is a moral power 
higher than the Stateo Throughout the ages, men 
have suffered death rather than subordinate their 
allegiance to God to the authority of the State. 
Freedom of religion guaranteed by the3~irst Amend-
ment is the product of that struggle. 
In estimating whether Congress may deny exemption altogether to 
35279 U.S. 644 (1929). 
36283 U,So 615. Both of these cases have been overruled by 
Girouard v Uni.ted States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946). Subsequently, Congress 
inserted a conscientious objector exemption into the naturalization 
act. This statement, like its counter part in the Draft Act of 1948, 
contain~ the "religious training and belief" and the "Supreme Being" 
requirements. 
37328 U.S. 61 (1946). 
38rbid., p. 68 (dictum). 
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conscientious objectors, one must take into account relevant decisions 
on related problems, since claims of religious conscientious objectors 
raise the "problem of governmental authority to compel behavior offen-
sive to religious principles" and not the "issue of governmental power 
to regulate or prohibit conduct motivated by religious beliefs. 1139 
The court's decision within the last few years has enlarged the 
scope of the free exercise clause of religious objectors. For example, 
.. - -·40 
Sherbert v Verner involved a Seventh-Day Adventist who was deI),ied un-
employment compensation by South Carolina because she refused to work 
on Saturday, her faith's Sabbath being Saturday. The reason for her 
rejection of governmental authority was a personal one even though the 
state had a general rule of denying compensation to persons whose 
linava'flabfllt;y for work was due to merely personal reasons. The Court 
concluded that there was no "compelling state interest enforced in the 
eligibility provisions of the South Carolina statute; [which] justifies 
the substantial infringement qf an appellant's First Amendment right," 
and that a "showing merely of a rational relationship to some colorable 
state interest would [not] suffice; in this highly sensitive constitu-
tional area, '[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount inter-
ests, give occasion for permissible limitation. , ,.41 Therefore, 
only compelling considerations of public interest could warrant such a 
state action. For example, the freedom of worship may be restricted in 
39Abington School Dist. v Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963), 
(Brennan, J. , Concurring) • 
4o374 U.S. 398 (1963), 
-- -- - -· -· - ~ --- .... -· ·- .. . .. 
41rbid., p. 406, quoting from.Thomas v Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 
(1945). 
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order to protect iillportant public ·interests. Safety may be a decisive 
factor, as in the case of laws directed against handling of snakes at a 
bl . . 42 pu ic meet1ng. Individuals and churches in their religious activi-
ties may claim the benefit of tne state's general laws for the protec-
tion of person and property. Public places may be used for religious 
. 43 
services. States may enact 1 h S d 1 . l 44 aws sue as un ay cosing aws, or 
provide transportation at public expense of children attending all 
schools, 45 where the purpose is;to advance legitimate secular purposes. 
In those instances where legisl~tive measures impinge in a substantial 
way on religious freedom, the state faces the burden of demonstrating 
that there are important, substantial, and compelling public interests 
that require subordination of individual liberty to the common good. 
According to the Sherbert Case, the government may even be constitution-
ally required to grant exemptions on religious grounds under certain 
types of statutes in order not to burden the free exercise of religion 
where important public interests are not prejudiced by granting the 
exemptions. If a state provides exemption in favor of free exercise 
of religion, why could not the national government similarly exempt, 
in favor of the free exercise of religion, those who are opposed to 
participation in war for religious reasons1 On one hand, it can be 
argued that forbidding a state to deny unemployment benefits because 
42 
~· Harden v State, 188 Tennessee 17, 216 SW 2d 708 (1948). 
43saia v New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Kunz v ~ York, 340 U.S. 
290 (1951); Ni~t~ Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951). 
44 • McGowan v Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1962), 
45Everson v M of M·, 330 U, S. 1 (194 7). 
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of religious beliefs does not go as far in giving effect to the free 
exercise clause as prohibiting the national government, in the interests 
of religious freedom, from performing its military obligations. That 
is, the Federal government's interest in raising armies would exceed 
any interest a state may have in denying unemployment compensation to 
a particular class of persons. But on the other hand, granting to 
goverrunent a greater interest in military obligation, while compelling 
religious objectors to render military service in violation of their 
scruples, constitutes an incomparably greater interference with their 
religious freedom than that.forbidden in the Sherbert Case. Therefore, 
- .. -
it would seem that their religious beliefs should weigh more heavily 
in balance and should be within the protection of the free exercise 
clause, even against the greater interest of goverrunent, 
Third, since the government provided an exemption recognizing 
conscientious objectors, the exemption should not discriminate among 
religions. For example, the essence of the equal protection clause is 
the prevention of unwarranted class differentiation. That is, .the 
government cannot classify according to race because the Court, in 
Brown v Board of Education, held this to be an inherently arbitrary. 
1 · 'f. . 46 c ass1. 1.cat1.on. Therefore, why should types of religion or non-
religion be a less irrational basis of differentiation especially in. 
light of the establishment clause whic.h forbids Congress or any other· 
governmental unit from basing any distinction.ofi religious grounds. 
The· only basis for distinguishing between two types of conscientiou.s. 
objectors is that one is religious and. the bther is not. It follows 
46347 U.S •. 483 (1954). Shelley v Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)., 
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then that the exemption benefits religion. Congress has enacted a 
policy through its Draft Act Section 6 (j) which prefers certain 
specified religious conscienti01,1s objectors over others. That is, 
preference for religious objectors as· opposed to non-religious objec-
tors who base their beliefs on secular ideology, The result of this 
arbi.trary preference is an indirect recognition of only those religions 
which_profess the existence of a Supreme Being. It would therefore 
follow that in matters of constitutional law Congress cannot do in-
directly that which it is forbidden to do directly, and in our present 
context that would extend to establishing religion. 47 
A further complication is represented by the statement Mr. Justice 
Douglas made regarding the government's neutrality in religious matters. 
The First Amendment connnands government to have 
no interest in theology or ritual •• , [o]n matters 
of this kind government must be neutral. This freedom 
plainly includes freedom from religion •• , , The 
"establishment" clause protects citizens also against 
any law which , .. puts the force of government behind 
••• [religious belief] and fines, imprisons, or other- 48 
wise penalizes a person for not observing ..• [religion]. 
What constitutes neutrality and how far the government can accom-
modate religion without overstepping constitutional bounds are highly 
debatable questions having no single solution, The issue of neutrality 
comes into focus in the case of conscientious objection to military 
service, where commands or dictates of conscience, though not prompted 
'i\ 
by religion; are just as vital as those with religious sanctions. Can 
47 Oyama v California, 332 u. s. 633~ 636 (1948). 
48 McGowan v Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 564 (1961) (dissenting 
opinion). 
46 
the state be "steadfastly neutral in all matters of faith1149 when it 
grants conscientious objector$ exemption to military service on 
religious grounds and rejects claims based on the compelling dictates 
of conscience. Perhaps the court's test in Seeger provides some 
answer: "Does the claimed belief occupy the same place in the life of 
the objector as an orthodox.belief in God holds in the life of one 
clearly qual,ified for exemption? 1150 It would therefore seem that 
conscientious scruples against participation in war, unallied with 
religious beliefs, but "equally paramount in the lives of their 
51 possessors,". ought to command the same constitutional protection. 
The First Amendment, which protects the "free exercise of religion," 
protects freedom of belief as well, and prohibits aiding religion 
. b. 1· 52 against non- e ievers. 
The Supreme Court stated in Cantwell v Connecticut53 that, while 
the freedom of belief is absolute, the freedom to exercise one's. 
religion is relative and may be limited in the public interest. For 
example, medical treatment such as vaccinat~on may be necessary to 
prevent the spread of epidemic disease.despite religious.convictions, 54 
55 
or flouridation of the water supply may be a nece$sary health measure. 
49Abington ~chool District v Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 299 (1963) 
(Brennan concurring opinion) 
50united States v Seeger, 380 U.~. 163, 184 (1965). 
51Ibid., p. 183 
52Torcaso v Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 496, 495 (1961). 
53310 U.$. 296 (1940) 
54 · • Jacobson v Massachussetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
55Baer v City of Ben, 206 Oregon 221, 292 P. 2d 134 (1956). 
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Likewise, the state may punish 9vert behavior which offends deeply 
rooted moral conceptions reflected in the laws of the state. For 
example, the Supreme Court held that the Federal government could 
.prohibit the pr1:1-ctice of polygamy by the MQrmons in Ut,;1.h Territory even 
h h h . . 1 . d h .· 1 · . . 56 t oug t is p,ractice was. c aime to ave re 1g1ous sanction. 
Nevertheless, there l::!-re cases where the courts have not founc:i, the 
substantial a{ld compelling public interests re<\uired to warrant the 
restriction on conscience. For e~ample, a person may not be requi~ed 
to take an oath affirming religious belief as a condition of public 
ff . 57 o ice. ~uch a "religious,test'for public office unconstitutionally 
invades , •• freedom of belief and religion and therefore cannot be 
f d 1158 en orce • • • • Similarly, a state cannot requ:i,.re a salute to the 
flag from one who is opposed·on religious as well as on non-religious. 
59 grounds. Mr, Justice Robert H. ,Jackson states~ 
Nor does the.issue as we see it turn on one's 
possession of particular religious views or the 
sincerity with which they are held, While religion 
supplies. appellees' ,motive for· enduring the discomforts 
of making the issue in this case, many citizens wh-0 do 
not share these religious views hold such a compulsory 60 
rite to infringe constitutional liberty of the individual. : · 
In the Torcaso Case, as well as• the Barnette Case, . there may be con-
scientious scruples, .not derived from religious beliefs, which may have 
a force as strong as religious scruples and be entitled to. the same 
56Reynolds .v United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879). 
57 Torcaso v Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). 
58Ibid,, P• 496 .. 
59w v · • · '. s' ·t t B d f Ed B tt 319 u· s 624 (1943) ~ irg1n1a . ~ e o.ar . .Q._ -·· -·· v .arne e·, • • • 
60Ibid., pp. 634-35. 
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treatment under the Constitution.· Therefore, granting exemption to 
objectors on religious grounds but denying it to conscientious objectors 
whose grounds are humanitarian, moral, philosophical, or ethical should 
be held to violate the government's duty of neutrality "in its relation 
with . . . religious believers and non-believers. 1161 This should be 
held whether or not religious objectors have an independent claim to 
exemption under the free exercise clause. Otherwise, the separation 
between religion and state would be broken, even though tolerant 
interpretation of the establishment clause permits accommodation of 
religion to avoid discrimination against religious belief and denial of 
religious freedom. The establishment clause "means at least this: 
Neither a state nor the Federal Government ..•. can pass laws which 
• aid all religions nor influence a person •.• or fore~ 
him to profess a disbelief in any religion • • [or penalize him]• for 
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs •• 1162 
"In short •• , the [First] Amendment 'requires the state to be a 
neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-
believers. , 1163 
Consequently, the government may not act to discriminate against .. 
religion or grant it a preferred position. The concept of religion 
is construed in a broad enough way in the Seeger Case to include any 
sense of ethical force stemming from a creed~ ideology, or philosophy 
which may or may not center on a.supernatural being. A distinctiqn, 
61Everson v Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947). 
62 rbid., pp. 15-16 (dictum), 
63Abington School Distri.ct v Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 218 (1963), 
quoting from Everson v Board of Education at p, 18. 
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therefore, between a religious belief and a philosophical, moral, or 
ethical belief which cannot be rationally distinguished, is not a con-
stitutionally valid ground for discriminating in the granting of 
exemption from military service. 
If either [the purpose or the primary effect of the 
state's. action] is the advancement or i~hibition of 
religion then [it] ••• exceeds the scope of legis-
lative power as circtpnscribed by the.Constitution • 
[T]o withstand the strictures of the Establishment 
Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose 
and a primary effeg~ that neither advances nor 
inhibits religion. 
In addition, the distinction between religious and non-religious 
objectors made by Congress violates the due process clause of the 
Fifth Amendment by denying equal protection. 65 
It would also result in a denial of equal 
protection by preferring some religions over 
other -- an invidious discrimination that would 
run afoul gi the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, 
67 · In Bolling v Sharpe, the Court held that although the "Fifth 
Amendment •.• does not contain an equal protection clause as does the 
Fourteenth Amendment which applies only to thestates, ••• the concepts 
of equal protection a~d due process ••• are not mutually exclusive. 
The 'equal protection of the laws' is a more explicit safeguard of 
prohibited unfairness than 'due process of law,' and, therefore, we do 
not imply that the two are always interchangeable phrases." The Court 
64 . · 
374 U.S. at p. 222. 
65see Bolling v Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
' '.' 
66united States v Seeger,; 380 U.S. 163, 188 (1955) (Douglas, J .• , 
concurring). 
67347 u.s. 497 (1954). 
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however, recognized that "discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to 
be violative of due process.''. Therefore, "a burden that cons ti tut es an 
arbitrary deprivation of • · • • liberty" is "in violation of the Due 
Process Clause. 1198 
The Court in Seea.er;, pointed out that the distinction between 
religious beliefs which the statute includes and the social, moral, or 
philosophical beliefs which it excludes are impossible to define. 
Further, it is not possible to formulate a definition of religion in 
such a way as to distinguish it from philosophical, social or moral 
views. Examples cif this can be found among the wide range of 
"religious" beliefs to which the Court refers, extending from acceptance 
69 
of the supernatural to doctrines of ethical humanism and beyond, 
as well as the Court's view that "in such an intensely personal area 
, •• the claim of the registrant that his belief is an essential part 
of a religious faith must be given great weight. 1170 Therefore, a 
distinction between a religious belief and a philosophical, 1,11oral, or 
ethical belief, being subjective, is not a constitutionally valid 
ground for discriminating in the granting of exemptions from military 
service. 
In conclusion, although the Seeger decision approved a broad 
definition of religion, it contin1.,1.es to pose legal and constitutional 
problems for the conscientious objector: 
(1) Does the court still subscribe to the traditional view 
that the exemption of conscientious objectors.is a 
68Ibid. 
69 380 .U.S. 163, pp. 174-75, 180-83 (1965). 
70rbid_. , p. 184 
matter of legislative grace and not of constitu-
tional right? 
(2) Must Congress, when it exempts religious objectors, 
exempt non-religious objectors as well? 
(3) May Congress, when it _grants exemption to religious 
objectors, constitutionally limit that exemption to 
those p1;ofessing belief in a deity~ 
(4) May Congress, in granting exemption, distinguish. 
between tb,ose.who object to all war as against 
.having equally sincere and compelling convictions 
against the morality of a particular war? 
(5) What recognition, .if any, must be accorded the 
absolutist, the petson who conscientiously 
objects to registration, as well as to all.forms 
of prescribed serv~1e., however remote from 
military activity? 
. Military -Selective ·Seryice Act of 196 7 
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The Selective Service Act of 1967 contains two significant amend-
ments to the previous statutory provision regarding the status of 
conscientious.objectors •. The earlier provision exempted those con-
scientious objectors who based their oppostion to war.on "religious. 
training and belief," which was defined as "belief in a Supreme ~eing 
involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation 
The first amendment 73 to section 6 (j) eliminated the 
reference to a Supreme Being, which was the statutory definition of 
"religious training and belief." 
Nothing contained in this title shall be construed to 
require any person to be subject to co~batant training 
71clyde E •. Jacob.s and Joh~ F. Gallagher, The Selective Service Act: 
A Case Study of the Governmental Process. (New York, 1967), p. 187. 
7262 Stat. 612 (1948, as amended, 50 USC App 456 (j) (1964). 
7381 Stat. 104, .Pub L No. 90-40 (June 30; 1967), 
and service in the armed forces of the United States 
who, by reason of religious training and belief, is 
conscientiously opposed to participation in war in 
any form. As used in this subsection, the term 
I religious training and belief' . does . not include 
essentially political, sociological, or7~hilosophical 
views, or a merely personal moral code.· 
It seems that Congress disapproved of t4e liberal definition of 
"Supreme Being" provided by the Supreme Court in United States v 
75 Seeger. The Conference Report states that it is the conferees' 
52 
intent to "more narrowly construe the basis of classifying registrants 
as conscientious objectors. 1176 The term religious training should not 
include "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views, 
or merely personal moral code." 
The Senate conferees also concurred in the desire 
of the House language to more narrowly construe the 
basis for classifying registrants as "conscientious 
objectors.". The recommended House language required 
that the claim for conscientious objection must be 
based upon "religious training and belief" as had been 
the original inten77of Cqngress in drafting this pro-
vision of the law. 
How congressional action will affect the courts, .however, is 
questionable, since the liberal judicial interpretation of "religious. 
training and belief" was probably the prime motivating factor in 
enacting the Supreme Being clause as a limiting device in 1948 •. So, 
Congress by removing the Supreme Being clause in attempting to l:i,mit 
the Seeger decision may have liberalized the section. Therefore, the 
74Ibid. 
75380 U.S. 163 (1965), See Congressional Quarterly, XXV (1967), 
P• 1051, 1053. 
76 House of Representatives Conference Report No. 346. 90th 
Congress, p, 15. 
77Ibid. 
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provision in the Draft Act of 1967 is no guarantee against broad 
judicial interpretation. Furthermore, it would seem that serious 
questions of unfair discrimination among religious beliefs may result 
from strict interpretation of the statute, 
Finally, the second amendment to the exemption eliminates the 
special investigation conducted by the Justice Department in cases 
appealed by a registrant whose local draft board denied his 
• . b" 1 l . 78 conscientious o Jector s c aim. 
78 81 Stat. 104, Pub L No. 90-40 (June 30, 1967). 
CHAPTER IV 
SELECTIVE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS 
Conscientious objectors hold in common a tendency to refuse to 
participate in a war regardless of personal consequences. Beyond this, 
1 however, there are probably few convictions which they all share. For 
example, some may oppose military service only in a particular war they 
consider unjust or otherwise morally or ethically unsupportable while 
others may oppose military service in any war in any form. The selec-
tive conscientious objector is one who opposes a particular war, but 
not all wars. He would examine the circumstances of a given war and 
measure them against the criteria for a just war. Briefly, the 
principal elements of the just war theory are: 
(1) The requirement that war be a last resort to 
be used only after all other means have been 
exhausted, 
(2) The requirement that war be clearly an act of 
defense against demands backed by the threat 
of force. 
(3) The requirement .that war be openly and legally 
declared by properly constituted government. 
(4) ,The requirement that there be a reasonable 
prospect for victory. 
1see generally I U.S. Selective Service System, Conscientious 
Objecti<Dn 2-4 (Special Monograph No. 11, 1950); Sibley and Jacob, 
Conscription of Consciience 18-43 (1952). 
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(5) The requirement that the means be propor-
tionate to the ends, 
(6) The requirement that a war be waged in such 
way as to distinguish between combatants and 
noncombatants. 
(7) The requirement that the victorious nation not 2 
require the utter humiliation of the vanquished • 
. The just war theory provides a minimal set of criteria for judging a 
particular war. In addition, the theory is predicat.ed upon ;the 
Aristolelian assumption that it is impossible to separate ethical-. 
religious judgments from political judgments. 
Should a registrant be granted an exemption because he is con-
' 
55 
scientiously opposed to military service on the grounds.that he believes 
a particular war is unjust? It is dif:l;icult to draw the line of exemp-
tion for conscientious objectors. For example, if the exemption is. 
broadly expanded, the Federal Government's defense and security may be 
endangered. On the other hand, if the exemption is narrowly confined 
to certain forms of conscientious objection, the draft law may be 
considered arbitrary and discriminatory. 
The validity of the conscientious objector's exemption is dependen~ 
upon a valid and reasonable classification. The House Armed Services 
Committee eliminated the Supreme Being clause from the old draft law, 
which the Supreme Court used in the 1965 Seeger Case in order to broaden 
the definition of religious conscientious objectors. Now, the law 
exempts anyone "who by religious training and belief is conscientiously 
opposed to participation in war in any form." The term religious 
2Richard J. Niebanck, Conscience, War and The Selective Objector 
(Board of Social Ministry, 1968), pp. 19-21. See, Steward Meacham, 
"Resistance to the Draft,'' Liberation, March, 1966, p, 24. 
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training should not include "essentially political, sociological, or 
3 philosophical views, or merely personal moral code." It is submitted 
that the present draft law is unconstitutional because it fails to 
grant exemptions to those who are conscientious objectors on non-
religious grounds. As such, the present law puts the government in 
support of specific religious beliefs and discriminates against atheists 
or those men who "whether they be religious or not are motivated in 
their objection to the draft by profound moral beliefs which constitute. 
the central convictions of their beliefs. 114 Denying exemption to those 
pacifists who do not subscribe to the government's religious doctrirte 
and qualification violates the provision of the First Amendment that 
"Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . .. s Furthermore, the 
law does.not recognize the selective conscientious objector. Is that 
limitation any more justifiable than a requirement that objection be 
based on a belief in a Supreme Being? Why should not a person who is 
conscientiously and religiously opposed to unjust wars allege that to 
deny him con~cientious objector's status while granting it to an 
absolute pacifist is religious discrimination in violation of the First 
Amendment? That is, it discriminates between citizens with regard to 
their qualification for legal protection on the basis of the content of 
their moral beliefs. 
3 81 Stat, 104, Pub L. No. 90-40 (June 30, 1967), 
4 . Houston Chronicle, April 1, 1969, p. 4. 
5constitution of the United States, First Amendment. 
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Selective Objection and Public Policy 
Since the President and Congress have not recognized the right of 
selective conscientious objectors, their reasoning will be examined. 
The most authoritative recent statement made by advocates of change in 
the selective service law favoring the selective conscientious objector 
is contained in the Report of .the National Advisory Commission on 
Selective Servicet otherwise known as the Marshall Commission (named 
after Burke Marshall, its chairman), Although the Marshall Commission 
did not endorse legal recognition of selective objection, the Commission 
did give fair representation of it in its final report, 
The first proposal, made by the Marshall Commission, was that the 
statute should be amended to eliminate the requirement that conscien-
tious,objectors mu~t be against war in all forms •. The report asserted 
that altl).ough "the moral position of absolute pacifism. shoulc). 
continue to be honored, • it should not be accorded its present 
place of privilege as the legal doctrine which alone controls the 
issue of conscientious objection • · ••. , 116 Furthermore, the Marshall 
Commission members recognized the responsibility of a citizen for his 
own personal moral judgments on matters of public safety. 
In particular cases, therefore, it can happen that 
the conscientious moral judgment of the citizen is in 
conflict with the judgments made by government, either 
with regard to the justice of the nation's cause or with 
regard to the measure and mode in which military force 
is to be employed in the defense of the nation's vital 
6111n pursuit of Equity: Who Serves When Not All Serve?" Report 
of the National Advisory Committee .Q!!. Selective Service, Washington, 
D. C.: Government Printing Office~ 1967, PP• 48-49. 
interests. In such cases the citizen should not be 
compelled by goverriment to ac5 against his conscience 
by being forced to bear arms. · 
The second.proposal, made by the Marshall Commission, was that 
"public recognition should be given to the fact that there may be. 
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moral validity to the conscientious objection to particular wars," and 
that "measures should be taken to make an effective distinction between 
two groups presently existent within the student community. 118 
There are responsible students who feel themselves 
caught in a dilemma, namely, between their duty to 
their country and what they see as the exigencies 
of personal integrity and conscience. This group 
deserves serious consideration. There is also the 
handful of irresponsible individuals whose opposition 
to .particular wars is simply part of a broader revolt 
against organized society. This group should be 
deprived of an issue which gives them aij opportunity 
of seeming to represent all opposition. 
Although serious consideration was given to the position of the 
selective obj~ctor, the majority of the Marshall Commission voted to 
retain the present requirement of the statute, that conscientious 
obj ~ct ion be )~s .. ed on moral opposition to war in all forms. Thus, in 
order to suppc;;f:·.their conclusion, tb.e Commission advanced the follow-
ing statements: 
(~j''.'':"~~,e question of "Classical Christian doctrine" 
. · · ·:i/tfo the subject of just and unjust wars is one 
which would be interpreted in different ways 
by different Christian denominations and there-
fore not a matter upon which the Commission could 
. pass judgment. 
(2) The majority holds that so-called selective 
pacifism is essentially a political question of 
7Ibid. 
8Ibid. 
9Ibid. 
support or nonsupport of a war and cannot be 
judged in terms of special moral imperatives. 
Political opposition to a particular war should 
be expressed through recognized democratic 
processes and should claim no special right of 
exemption from democratic decisions. 
(3) Legal recognition of selective pacifism coul4 
open the doors to a general theory of selective 
disobedience to law. 
(4) The majority of the Commission was unable to 
see the morality of a proposition which woul~ 
permit the selective pacifist to avoid combat 
service by performing noncombatant service in 
support of a war which he.had theoretic~lly 
concluded to be unjust •. 
(5) Legal recognition of selective pacifism could 
be disruptive to the mora+e and effectiveness 
of the Armed Forces. Forcing upon the in4ividual 
the necessity of making that distinction -- which 
would be the practical effect of taking away the. 
Government's obligation of making it for him --
could put a burden heretofore unknown on the man 
in uniform and even on the brink of combat, with 
results that could well be disastrous to him, f8 
his unit and to the entire military tradition. 
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The decision of the Marshall Commission, therefore, seems to have 
been .based on the conviction that providing exemption only for ideolog-
ical pacifists is.neater from a legal standpoint, and that recognition 
of the selective objector could lead to a general civil disobedience. 
Nevertheless, these reasons for objecting to the recognition of t4e 
selective conscientious objector need to be analyzed since selective 
obJection raises legal, political, ethical, and religious questions~ 
It seems apparent that the Marshall Commission refused to 
acknowledge any relevant moral or political support for the position 
of the selective conscientious objector. "The question of 'Classical 
Christine doctrine' on the subject of just and unjust wars is one which 
lOibid., pp. 50-51 
60 
would be interpreted in different ways by different Christian denomina-
tions and therefore not a matter upon which the Commission could pa$s 
' . 
judgment ... ;n No one can deny that moral principles of differing content 
and degree of generality and claims of absoluteness may be held and 
practiced by different persons with equal conscientiousness. Since the 
law aims to respect the conscientious objector, the requirement, 
therefore, that one must be opposed to war in every form is morally 
unjust. To exclude the just war doctrine which is a tenet of the 
Catholic Church amounts .to religious preference, It discriminates 
between citizens regarding their quali~ications for legal protection 
on the basis of the content of their moral principles. The law should 
apply equally to all who are conscientiou$ly opposed to military 
service, and not reserved for some only l;>ecause of their special 
beliefs. 
The Marshall Commission held that selective pacifism coulq not be 
judged in terms of special moral imperatives because selective pacifism 
is essentially a political question of support or nonsupport of~ war. 
"Political opposition to a particular war should be expressed throug9-
recognized democratic processes and should claim no special right of. 
· f d · d . . 1112 exemption rom emocrat1.c ec1.s1.ons. .. Would it be possible for a 
person to be a religious objector if he is sincere and conscientiously 
opposed to participating in the war in Vietnam based on his religious 
convictions? Obviously not, if Congress maintains the premise that 
selective pacifism is essentially a political question and rules out. 
11rbid. , p. 50. 
12 Ibid. 
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its recognition. Furthermore, a selective pacifist opposed to a parti-
cular war may be just as sincere and authentically conscientious as an 
absolute pacifist, 
The Marshall Commission further contended that "legal recognition 
of selective pacifism could open the doors to a general theory of 
selective disobedience to law, which could quickly tear down the fabric 
13 
of government," There is no evidence to support the view that if 
selective conscientious objectors are recognized, a large number of 
claims to exemption will be made, because it is not certain how many 
people will take this position. "As of 1966, conscientious objectors. 
amounted to substantially less than one percent of all registrants in 
14 the Selective Service System." Tables I and II in the appendix show 
the number and percentage of conscientious objectors classified as I~o 
and I-W. It does not seem that the Federal Government's ability to 
carry on a war will be impaired by such a minority. 
Whoever claims to be a conscientious objector must make specific 
application for that status and must undergo intense examination by 
the classification agency. H~ must show through his tes.timony and the 
testimony of his teachers and associates that the moral scrup1es he 
professes are part of his conscientiously held position. "Among the 
factors considered are such items as membership in a peace church, 
training in home a~d church, the general qemeanor and pattern of con-
duct of the individual, his employment in defense-connected activities, 
13Ibid. 
14 Abe Fortas, Concerning Diesent and Civil Disobedience (New York, 
1968), p, 50. 
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his participation in religious activities, and his credibility and the 
credibility of persons supporting his claim. 1115 All of the same 
pressures to conformity would operate fully upon the registrant seeking 
selective conscientious objection as they do now upon the pacifist 
objector. The small proportion of those eligible and the proportion 
among them who will choose to enter the long road toward establishing 
exemption cannot be expected to be large (See Ta~le II). 
What is decided by the classifying agency is not the correctness 
of the moral beliefs held by the registrant, but his sincerity and the 
objective truth of his claims. Rules and procedures should be designed 
to insure the protection and equal treatment of all those who are 
genuinely conscientious. Thus, the line drawn at universal objection 
to war should be changed to include those who object to particular wars 
based on moral and religious grounds. 
The Marshall Connnission "was unable to see the morality of a. 
proposition which would permit the selective pacifist to avoid combat 
service by performing noncombatant service in support of a war which 
he had'theoretically concluded to be unjust. 1116 In view of the 
Marshall Commission's first statement that the subject of the just war 
doctrine is beyond the competence of the Commission, 't'here is no more 
inconsistency involved in permitting selective pacifists to perform 
noncombatant service in a war they have concluded to be unjust than 
there is in permitting absolute pacifists to perform noncombatant 
service. 
1511National Defense - Title 32," Federal Register, Vol. 33, No, 9 
(January 13, 1968) p. 493. 
16 Report of th.e National Advisory Committee on Selective Service, 
P• 50. 
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Finally, the Marshall Commission majority held that "legal recog- · 
nition of selective pacifism could be disruptive to the morale and 
effectiveness of the Armed Forces. Forcing upon the individual the 
necessity of making that distinction -- which would have the practical 
effect ~f taking away the Government's obligation of making it. for 
him could put a burden ••• on the man in uniform ••• his unit 
and to the entire military tradition. 1117 . Here the Marshall Commission 
yielded completely to the military.point of view. They seemed to 
assume that no judgment is possible with respect to a given war except 
that of the executive branch and of the military. It is agreed that 
citizens have an obligation to abide by the decisions of the body 
politic, especially in a democracy where they have a right to partici-
pate in making those decisions. However, does this obligation to abide 
by the lawful decisions. of the community . overrida:i all other obligations 
a citizen may have. For exainple, a citizen called to serve.in the 
military may refuse on grounds of conscience. He may conclude that 
the decision of the majority calls for conduct which is to him morally 
intolerable. ";r:t can happen that the conscienti.ous moral judgment of 
. .,_ 
the citizen is in conflict with the judgments made by government, 
either in regard to the justice of the nati9n's cause or with regard 
to the measure and mode.in which military force is to be employed in. 
defense of the nation's vital interests. In such cases the citizen 
should not be compel.led by government .to act against his conscience 
by being forced to bear 
l7 Ibid.·, pp. 50-51. 
18Ibid., p. 46 
18 
arms."· In matters of deep moral principle, 
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no one can relieve the individual of his duty to exercise his moral 
judgment; all the state can do is make it harder or easier for him to 
act in accordance with that judgment. Present provisions for con-
scientious objectors do make it easier for some conscientious objector$ 
to exercise their moral judgment. Certain provisions, however, need 
to be changed in order to insure the protection and equal treatment of 
all objectors who are genuinely conscientious. 
Other difficulties in the recognition of selective objection, in 
addition to those noted by the Marshall Connnission, concern the pract~ 
ical problem of determining who are sincere objectors. This problem 
of judging who are sincere selective objectors should be.no greater 
than that of judging who are sincere pacifists. Because selective 
objection is based upon a number of considerations, and is a more 
complex position, selective object9rs might be expected to be less 
fraudulent in their presentation and testimony than pacifists. What 
has to be de~ided by the classifying agency is not the correctness. of 
the moral convictions of the applicant, but the objective truth or 
falsity of his claim. The Court, in the Seeger Case pointed out that 
"local boards and courts are to decide whether the objector's beliefs 
, are sincerely held In addition to the Seeger rule, there 
are other criteria which might be used to judge the sincerity of the 
selective conscientious objector. For example, Alan F. Geyer, Director 
for International Relations, Council for Christian Social Action,. 
suggests the following: 
(1) The selective objector should present evidence 
19united.States v Seeger, 380 U.S. 163. 
of his careful study of the issues at stake in 
which he refuses to participate. , , , 
(2) The selective objector should demonstrate that he 
is capable of a serious effort at.moral reasoning 
in the attempt to relate his convictions to the 
data which he possesses , .. , , , 
(3) The selective objector should be called upon to 
de~onstrate that he has sought to give his 
convictions political expression.,• , • 
(4) The selective objector should indicate his 
willingness to serve in some military capacity 
other than engagement in the particular conflict 
to which he objects •.•• 
(5) The selective objector should indicate his 
willingness to accept whatever legal pen2bties 
his position may impose upon him • , 
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In conclusion, Congress has made it clear that exemption is avail-
able to those who object to "war in any form". Nevertheless, the 
exemption should be extended to those who object to a particular war 
in view of the free exercis.e of religion clause, That is, objection 
to serve in so-called unjust wars finds support in various religious 
traditions, and to deny exemption to these dissenters while granting 
it to :those who object to all wars is preferential treatment for 
particular religious beliefs in violation of the First Amendment. Tqe 
sectibn of the Selective Service Act which defines conscientious. objec-. 
·'·W· 
tion should be designed to insure the protection and equal treatment 
of all objectors who are conscientiously opposed to military service, 
and not reserved for some only because of their special beliefs. 
20 · 11 11 Alan F. Geyer, The Just War and the Selective Objector,.~ 
Christian Century, February 16, 1966, reprinted in Social Action, 
April, 1966, pp, 17-18. 
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REFORMS 
It is suggested that Congress amend the Selective Service Act of 
1967 to provide suitable alternatives of military and civilian service 
for those who object to participation in a particular war on grounds 
of conscience. For e~a~ple, the following provisions for conscientious 
objectors,were_adopted by the General Board of Christian Social Concerns 
of the Methodist Church, April 12, 1967, and reconnnended to the House 
Armed Services Committee hearings: 
(1) Statutory recognition of moral, philosophical and 
humanitarian as well as religious motivation for 
conscientious objection. 
(2) Statutory provision for non-combatant military 
duty for those conscientiously opposed to combatant 
duty and alternative civilian service for those who 
conscientiously reject participation in any military 
training or duty. 
{3) Statutory recognition,of conscientious objectors to 
particular war, declared or undeclared, or to the 
one confronted at the time of induction. 
(4) Statutory provision for those in .the Armed Forces 
who become conscientious objectors to obtain non-
combatant status or to be honorably discharged 
through an orderly and ex~Iditious process subject 
to administrative review. 
Finally, the American Ethical Union recommended that Congress 
amend the Selective Serv:i,ce Act to provide legal recognition for con-
scientious objectors to particular wars, 
Whereas the development and exercise of individual 
conscience is encouraged by the highest teachings of the 
world's greatest philosophies and religions, and 
Whereas the American legal heritage has honored and 
protected the highest degree of liberty for the individual 
21Extension of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, 
No. 12 Hearings Before Armed Service Committee. House of Representa-· 
tives. 90th Congress 1st Session, May 2-11, 1967, p. 2410. 
conscience, and 
Whereas the conscience of many men compel them to 
object to particular wars and military acts even though 
they do not claim to be absolute pacifists or to object 
to every war which could conceively arise, and 
Whereas the convictions of such men are often just 
as strong and sincere as the convictions of absolute 
pacifists and equally deserving of legal recognition. 
Now therefore be it resolved that the American Ethical 
Union call upon Congress to amend the Selective Service Act 
to provide legal re~~gnition for conscientious objection 
to particular wars. 
22Ibid., p. 2419. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Our country has fairly consistently made provisions for exempting 
conscientious objectors from partic.ipating in war -under certain circum-
··stances. In 1863, the ·first Federal Conscription Law did not refer to 
conscientious objectors, but provided payment of three hundred .dollars 
for procurring a substitute. The draft act of 1864 provided exemption 
to those ·who were conscientiously opposed to bearing arms by reason of 
their religious denomination. Those who were·conscientiously opposed 
to bearing arms, however, had .to pay three hundred dollars for the 
benefit of the ·Sick and wounded or had to do hospital work instead of 
participating in the military service. The 1917 draft act exempted 
. >i: 
those members of well recogn~zed religious sects whose ·creed forbade 
them to participate in war. Congress eliminated payment and instead 
required them to ,serve in noncombatant duty. It was the-1940 Selective 
Training and Service Act which exempted anyone who by reason of his 
religious training and belief was conscientiously opposed to partici-
pating in war and eliminated the requirement that conscientious objec""! 
tors must be members of recognized pacifist sects,. Congress, in the 
Selective Service Act of 1948, added the -statutoi:y definition of 
religious training and belief to mean an individctai's belief in a 
Supreme Being. Although the committee reports suggest that the addi'-
tional language was used to codify the old law as interpreted by the 
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courts, the reference to Supreme Being was widely viewed as ·confining 
the exemption to only those who profess: , a belief in a Supreme Being 
_and orthodox religions. Furthermore, the law also excluded those con-
-scientious objectors-who did not refer to their beliefs as religious 
regardless of how sincerely the beliefs wete held. 
1 Thereafter, the Supreme Court in United_ States v Seeger ruled 
that the statutory provisions exempting _conscientious objectors could 
not be restricted to only those professing theistic religions and ex-
tended the -statute to include those conscientious objectors whose 
belief is "sincere and meaningful" and which "occupies ·a place iri the 
life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief 
in God of one ·who clearly qualifies for the exemption. 112 
The concept of religion was ,construed; in a broad enough way in 
the Seeger Case to include any sense of ethical force stemming from a 
creed, ideology, or philosophy which may or may not center on a .super-
natural being. Moreover, the Court in·Seeger pointed out that it is 
not possible to formulate a definition of religious belief in such a 
way as to distinguish it from philosophical, social, or moral beliefs. 
Examples of this can be found among the wide range of "religious" 
beliefs to which the Court refers, extending from acceptance of the 
3 
supernatural to doctrines of ethical humanism and beyond, .as well as 
the Court's view that "in such an.intensely personal area ••• the 
-claim of the.registrant that his belief is an essential part of a 
1380 u. s. 163 (1~65). 
2Ibid., P· 176. 
3 . 174-75, 180-83. -~., PP· 
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religious faith must be·given great weight. 114 Therefore, the hypoth-, 
·esis that there is a judicial trend toward enlargement of the area of 
legally acceptable conscientious objector ·status finds support in the 
broad way that the concept of religion was construed by the Court in 
the Seeger Case. Furthermore, the Court's opinion indicates a trend 
towards accepting a wide range of "religious" beliefs extending from 
acceptance of the supernatural to doctrines of ethical humanism and 
5 beyond, in order to provide equal protection of all objectors who are 
conscientiously opposed to participating in war, 
Recently, in the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, Congress 
eliminated the reference to a Supreme Being which was the ·Statutory 
definition of "reLigious training and belief." It seems that Congress 
disapproved of the ·liberal definition of "Supreme Being" provided by 
the Supreme Court in the·Seeger Case, In Congress' view, the term 
religious training .and belief should not include ."essentially -politi-
cal, sociological or philosophical views, or merely personal moral 
code." The language of the new provision is no guarantee against Tuiroad 
judicial interpretation since the liberal judicial interpretation of 
"religious training and belief" was probably the prime motivating 
factor in enacting the Supreme Being clause as a limiting device in 
1948. Furthermore, strict interpretation of the·1967 draft act exempt-
ing conscientious objectors ·may raise serious questions of improper 
discrimination·among religious beliefs, 
The validity of the conscientious objector's exemption is 
-n- --,-~~---------
4Ibid,, P• · 184 
5rbid., pp. 174-75, pp. 180-83. 
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dependent upon a valid and reasonable classification. A distinction 
between a religious belief and a philosophical, moral, or ethical 
belief which cannot be rationally distinguished is not a constitution-
ally valid ground for discriminating in the granting of exemption.from 
military service. Therefore, it is submitted that the present draft 
law fails to grant exemptions to those who.are conscientious objectors 
on non-religious grounds. As such the present law puts the govern-
ment in support of specific religious beliefs and discriminates against 
atheists or those men who ."whether they be religious or not are moti-
vated in their objection to the draft by profound moral beliefs which 
constitute the central convictions of their beliefs. 116 Therefore, the 
section exempting conscientious objectors in the 1967 draft law appears 
to violate the concept of equal protection which the Court has read 
into the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment because it discrimi-
nates among different forms of religious beliefs. Furthermore, deny-
ing exemption to those pacifists who do not subscribe to the govern-
ment' s religious doctrine and qualification also appears to violate the 
provisions of the First Amendment that "Congress shall make no law 
respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exer-
cise thereof. 
Finally, the 1967 draft law does not recognize the selective 
6rn·Boston, U. S, District Judge Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr. ruled 
that the Selective Service Act of 1967 was unconstitutional in viola-
tion of the First Amendment because it failed to grant exemptions to 
those who are conscientious objectors on non-religious grounds. 
Houston Chronicle, April 1, 1969, p. 1. 
7constittition of the United States, First Amendment. 
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conscientious objector, one who opposes a particular war. Congress has 
made it clear that exemption is available only those who object to "war 
in any form." Nevertheless, exemption from military service should be 
extended to those who object to a particular war. Objection to serve 
in so-called unjust wars finds support in various religious traditions, 
and to deny exemption to these dissenters while granting it to those 
who object to all wars is preferential treatment for particular 
religious beliefs, It is submitted that to deny conscientious objec-
tor's status to a person who is conscientiously opposed to unjust wars, 
while·granting conscientious objector's status to an absolute pacifist. 
may violate the First Amendment:. That is, it discriminates between 
citizens with regard to their qualification for legal protection on the 
basis of the content of their moral beliefs, The section exempting 
conscientious objectors should extend to all conscientious objectors 
in order to insure the protection and equal treatment of all objectors 
who are truly conscientiously opposed to participation in war. 
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TABLE I· 
CLASSIFICATION OF SELECTIVE SERVICE 
registrants, 1965-1967 
(In Thousands) 
Classification Status 
of Registrants, 18~-26 1965 1966 
years of age No. Percent No. Percent 
Conscientious objec-
tors available for 
civilian service I-0 11 0.1 9 0.1 
Conscientious objec-
tors working in civil-
ian service I-W 3 * 6 
1'( 
*Denotes less than 0.05 percent. 
80 
1967 
Nb. Percent 
11 
* 
6 
* 
SOURCE: U. &. Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the 
United States: 1968. (89th edition.) Washington, D. C., 1968 p 262. 
TABLE II 
CLASSIFICATION OF SELECTIVE SERVICE 
REGISTRANTS, September 30, 1966 
Class I-0 
81 
Class I-W 
Not Examined and 19-26 yrs 
of age 
At Work Released 
examined qualified 
Total 4,934.,.< 3,253.,.< 1, 550?'<' 6, 045 7: 
,'<Denotes less than O, 05 percent 
SOURCE: "In Pursuit of Equity: Who Serves When Not All Serve?" 
Report of the National Advisory Committee on Selective Service, 
Washington, D, C,: Government Printing Office, 1967, pp, 143-144, 
150-152, 
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